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 International Lease Accounting Reform and Economic Consequences: The Views of 
UK Users and Preparers  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In response to perceived difficulties with extant lease accounting standards in operation 
worldwide, the G4+1 issued a discussion paper which proposes that all leases should be 
recognised on the balance sheet (ASB, 1999).  Leasing is now on the active agenda of the 
IASB.  A major difficulty faced by standard setters lies in overcoming the preparer/user 
lobbying imbalance and obtaining ex ante evidence on the likely impact of regulatory 
reform.  This paper contributes to the ongoing international debate by conducting a 
questionnaire survey of UK users and preparers to assess their views on proposals for lease 
accounting reform and on the potential economic consequences of their adoption.  The 
results, based on 132 responses, indicate that both groups accept that there are deficiencies 
in the current rules, but they do not agree on the way forward and believe that the 
proposals would lead to significant economic consequences for key parties.  The impact on 
respondents’ views of familiarity with the proposals, level of lease usage, and company 
size, is also examined. 
 
Keywords: lease accounting; off-balance sheet finance; survey; economic consequences; 
lobbying 
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International lease Accounting Reform and Economic Consequences: The Views of 
UK Users and Preparers 
 
1. Introduction 
In many countries, operating leases represent a significant source of finance for many 
companies, far exceeding the significance of finance leases.  For example, it has recently 
been estimated that, for the top 100 listed UK companies, the median ratio of operating 
lease liability to debt is 0.11 and the median ratio of operating lease liability to finance 
lease liability is 6.2 (Beattie et al., 2004).1  Internationally, key leasing standards 
distinguish finance leases from operating leases, finance leases being defined as those 
which transfer substantially all the risks and rewards of ownership to the lessee.  The 
accounting treatment depends on the lease classification, with only finance leases being 
capitalised.   
 
Concerns regarding the off-balance sheet nature of operating leases, the different treatment 
of similar transactions and the ‘all or nothing’ approach have led many standard-setting 
bodies to consider treating all leases consistently.  This culminated in a G4+1 discussion 
paper ‘Leases: implementation of a new approach’ (ASB, 1999), which adopts a ‘property 
rights’ perspective and proposes that all leases should be recognised on the balance sheet, 
rather than just finance leases.2  Leasing is now on the active agenda of the IASB and the 
UK accounting standard-setting body was asked to undertake a project to inform the IASB, 
which expects to take action in 2006/07 (IASB, 2005).  The IASB has tentatively agreed 
with the G4+1 approach of analysing the contractual rights and obligations arising from 
lease contracts (ASB, 2004). 
 
The different accounting treatments have important implications for reported levels of 
indebtedness and for standard performance measures.  Profit margins, return on assets and 
gearing measures would all be significantly affected if operating leases were required to be 
recognised on the lessee’s balance sheet rather than merely disclosed in a footnote (Imhoff 
et al., 1991; Beattie et al., 1998; Goodacre, 2003).  It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
G4+1 proposals are controversial and have already generated a significant negative 
response from groups, in particular lessors and high operating lease use lessees, who fear 
that there would be major adverse economic consequences.  
 Certain major interested parties, such as preparers, audit firms and other groups (here, for 
example, the lessor group), are well organised to lobby the standard setters to ensure that 
their group views are heard.  However, users are generally a wider, more diverse, less 
organised group with less focus and often less technical knowledge for lobbying activities. 
It is widely recognised that a major difficulty faced by accounting standard setters world-
wide lies in obtaining the views of users of financial statements (Collins et al., 1996; Jonas 
and Young, 1998; Herz, 2003).  
 
This paper contributes to the ongoing international debate concerning lease accounting 
reform by reporting the results of a questionnaire survey sent to users (investment analysts) 
and preparers (finance directors).  The objectives of the research are to elicit and compare 
the views of both groups on a comprehensive range of issues surrounding lease accounting 
reform.  The issues are: views on accounting standards generally; deficiencies in the 
current UK standard; the general principles underlying the G4+1 proposals; the specific 
proposals regarding complex features of lease contracts; economic consequences; 
alternative proposals; and implementation.  The impact on views of three background 
characteristics is also examined: respondents’ declared familiarity with the proposals (for 
both users and preparers); level of lease usage (preparers only); and company size 
(preparers only).  The study represents policy-relevant ex ante research in support of the 
standard setting process of the type advocated by Schipper (1994). 
 
To provide some context for the present study, it should be noted that institutional 
differences are believed to affect corporate financing decisions. As leasing decisions are 
part of the overall financing decision, it is to be expected that these differences would also 
impact leasing decisions and hence interested parties’ views about lease accounting reform.  
The UK can be characterised as having a broadly similar financial and legal environment 
to the US.  It has a common law legal system with good investor protection and well-
developed, liquid financial markets.  Bank finance and inter-company ownership 
relationships play relatively smaller roles than in some countries. The most obvious 
differences between the UK and US (apart from the relatively great size of the US market 
in terms of number of companies and market capitalization) relate to tax and bankruptcy 
codes and the size of the corporate bond market (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  La Porta, et 
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 al. (1997, 1998) consider that a country’s legal system is the main determinant of external 
finance availability.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section two first provides a brief 
discussion of the current and proposed methods of accounting for leases.  It then reviews 
three strands of literature relevant to the debate on lease accounting reform: the 
preparer/user lobbying imbalance; the quality of accounting standards; and various 
approaches to the assessment of economic consequences.  The section ends with the 
presentation of the specific research questions addressed in the current study.  Section three 
outlines the methods employed, including sampling and data collection procedures.  
Results are presented in section four.  A final section summarises and concludes. 
 
2. Literature 
2.1 Lease accounting: extant regulations and proposals 
The international leasing standard (IAS 17 ‘Leases’) is typical of many extant standards 
worldwide.  It makes a fundamental distinction between finance leases and operating 
leases, defining a finance lease as one that transfers to the lessee substantially all the risks 
and rewards of ownership (IASB, 2003).  It is treated as an ‘in substance’ purchase by the 
lessee and sale by the lessor.  An asset is shown on the lessee’s balance sheet at the present 
value of the minimum lease payments and a corresponding liability is recognised.  An 
operating lease is any other lease.  The underlying asset appears in the balance sheet of the 
lessor and the lessee simply recognises the rental payments as an expense, with additional 
footnote disclosure regarding total minimum future lease rental commitments, with this 
commitment being classified into time horizon categories (less than one year, two to five 
years and more than five years). 
 
The equivalent US standard (SFAS 13), which uses the term ‘capital lease’ rather than 
‘finance lease’, introduces ‘bright lines’ into lease classification.  It defines a capital lease 
as one under which any one of the following four conditions is met: (i) the present value at 
the beginning of the lease term of the payments not representing executory costs paid by 
the lessor equals or exceeds 90% of the fair value of the leased asset; (ii) the lease transfers 
ownership of the asset to the lessee by the end of the lease term; (iii) the lease contains a 
bargain purchase price; (iv) the lease is equal to 75% or more of the estimated economic 
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 life of the leased asset (FASB, 1976).  The UK standard (SSAP 21) also includes a bright 
line classification test. Under SSAP 21, a lease is presumed to be a finance lease if the 
present value of the minimum lease payments at the inception of the lease amount to 
substantially all (normally 90% or more) of the fair value of the leased asset (ASC, 1984).3   
 
Bright line rules such as found in the US and UK standards carry the danger of creative 
compliance (i.e. the use of rules to escape control without actually violating those rules).  
‘Formalism’ in standard setting implies a narrow approach to control (i.e. the use of clearly 
defined rules), whereas ‘anti-formalism’ involves the use of principles (McBarnet and 
Whelan, 1991; 1992; 1999).   
 
In 1996, the G4+1 published a special report entitled ‘Accounting for leases: a new 
approach’ (McGregor, 1996).  Three fundamental deficiencies in existing lease accounting 
standards were identified.  First, material assets and liabilities arising from ‘off-balance 
sheet’ operating lease contracts are omitted.  Second, similar transactions do not receive 
the same accounting treatment since marginal differences in contractual terms can result in 
one lease being claimed as a finance lease and another as an operating lease.  This 
illustrates the weakness of so-called ‘bright line’ standards.  Third, the ‘all or nothing’ 
approach to the capitalisation of leased assets does not adequately reflect modern complex 
transactions.  A conceptual approach to lease accounting is advocated, whereby the 
distinction between finance leases and operating leases is removed.  Lessees would 
recognise as assets and liabilities all material rights and obligations arising under lease 
contracts. 
 
Three years later, the G4+1 organizations published a discussion paper ‘Leases: 
implementation of a new approach’, which develops the approach recommended in the 
special report (ASB, 1999).  It reiterates the view that all leases should be reflected in 
financial statements in a consistent manner and it explores the principles that should 
determine the extent of the assets and liabilities to be recognised by lessees and lessors.  
The discussion paper recommends that, at the beginning of a lease, the lessee recognises an 
asset and a liability equivalent to the fair value of the rights and obligations that are 
conveyed by the lease.  This is usually the present value of the minimum payments 
required by the lease.  Subsequently, the lease asset and liability would be treated as fixed 
 4
 assets and debt.  The other party to the transaction, the lessor, would report financial assets 
(representing amounts receivable from the lessee) and residual interests (if any) as separate 
assets.  Although lease contracts often include features such as renewal options, contingent 
rentals and residual value guarantees, the discussion paper considers ways of dealing with 
these and other features.  Essentially, the paper calls for the capitalization of the 
measurable future benefits and obligations for all lease transactions. 
 
Looking forward, it seems clear that the international convergence of accounting standards 
is going to happen.  A change on one standard is likely to impact on the standards for other 
jurisdictions.  The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for 
listed companies in the European Union occurs in 2005.  In the UK, the ASB has stated, in 
its consultation paper on UK convergence, that it will not replace SSAP 21 with a standard 
based on IFRS requirements until the IASB completes its leasing project (although in the 
short term it does propose to adopt IAS 17 disclosure requirements).  In the US, FASB 
agreed with the IASB to work towards the convergence of US GAAP and IFRS at a joint 
meeting in 2002 (Schipper, 2005).   
 
2.2 The preparer/user lobbying imbalance 
In recent years, there has been increasing recognition that users’ views regarding 
accounting standards are seriously under-represented.  Collins et al. (1996) report that only 
14 of the 104 letters of comment to the UK ASB regarding the OFR Discussion Paper were 
from users, and suggest that this imbalance must be remedied by seeking out users’ views 
explicitly.  Jonas and Young (1998) argue that quality in business reporting is being 
undermined by the systemic problem of insufficient user focus in the process of setting 
reporting standards.  One of the explanations they offer for the under-representation is that 
the professional background of standard-setters tends to be as preparers/auditors rather 
than users, making it difficult for them to ‘bridge the gap’.  More recently, the Chairman of 
the US standard-setting body (FASB) has suggested that it may be overly influenced by the 
preparer and auditor communities, identifying the low level of involvement by users as a 
challenge for the Board (Herz, 2003).   
 
Academic studies that survey attitudes to accounting standards have generally targeted 
preparers as the respondent group and have been conducted ex post.  For example, Hooks 
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 and van Staden (2004) survey preparers in New Zealand to elicit their views on FRS 15 
‘Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets’.  Joshi and Ramadhan (2002) 
survey Bahrainian preparers on issues surrounding IASs.  Nixon (1997) surveys UK 
preparers’ views on SSAP 13 (revised) ‘Accounting for Research and Development’ and 
an alternative suggested treatment whereby more expenditure would be capitalised.  It is 
notable that views are also elicited regarding the economic consequences of expensing 
R&D.  Reither (1998) surveys participants at the 1996 AAA/FASB Financial Reporting 
Issues Conference to establish what standards were viewed as the best and the worst.  User 
surveys have tended to address user needs in terms of the importance of specific 
information items, whether currently reported or not (for a recent example, see Beattie and 
Pratt, 2002).  Yap (1997) is one of the few studies to investigate users’ attitudes to a 
particular extant standard, specifically the Australian standard on cash flow statements.  
Dunne et al. (2003) interview users and preparers about FRS 13 ‘Derivatives and Other 
Financial Instruments – Disclosures’.  There is, however, a dearth of academic research 
that surveys users’ views on specific proposals for regulatory reform. 
 
The need for such research is further indicated by the fact that, of the 59 formal responses 
to the G4+1 discussion paper received by the ASB, just 3 (5%) were from users or user 
groups. Based on another simple measure (number of pages of response), users contributed 
just 7% of the overall response.  Since recent research suggests that the level of other 
forms of lobbying is highly correlated with the use of formal comment letters (Georgiou, 
2004), the absolute differential between the overall level of preparers and users lobbying 
could be huge.  
 
2.3 Quality of accounting standards 
The former Chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission has identified high 
quality standards as critical to financial reporting, going on to explain that ‘they must result 
in comparability and transparency, and they must provide for full disclosure’ (Levitt, 1998, 
p.81).  Following this, Accounting Horizons published six commentaries, from senior 
representatives of a range of constituencies, on the attributes of high quality accounting 
standards (Imhoff, 1998).  Interestingly, in Reither’s (1998) survey, SFAS 13 ‘Leases’ was 
voted the worst standard.  Explanations given included the following: many obligations 
that, in substance, are capital, sales-type, or direct financing leases are shown as operating 
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 leases; conceptually and operationally an accounting nightmare; bright-line rules for lease 
capitalisation result in abuse; and too complicated. 
 
Collins et al. (2002) link empirically the normative qualities reflected in the commentaries 
with the actual judgements of constituents.  Using content analysis, they identify 16 unique 
characteristics.  The particular characteristics of SFAS 13 that led it to be considered the 
worst standard were found to be lack of economic reality, lack of clarity, lack of 
implementation guidance and the need for frequent amendment.   
 
2.4 Economic consequences 
For over two decades, economic consequence arguments have been used by lobbying 
groups.  Economic consequences arise when changes in the information set reported 
affects a company’s cash flows or its distribution (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983).  This 
can occur in two ways.  First, there may be changes in either the behavior of users or the 
behavior of managers.  The latter includes actions to mitigate the expected impact on users, 
a situation known as ‘information inductance’ (Prakash and Rappaport, 1977).  Second, the 
company’s formal or informal contracts may be affected.  The identification and 
measurement of economic consequences is, however, problematic. Researchers have used 
four different empirical methods: the analysis of archival accounting data; market-based 
studies; experimental studies and surveys.  
 
First, the archival method either compares the accounting numbers pre- and post- a change 
in the accounting rules (an ex post study) or constructs pro-forma accounting statements 
based on proposed rule-changes and compares these with the statements under extant rules 
(an ex ante study).  In an early ex post study, Abdel-khalik (1981) found that company 
management responded to the introduction of SFAS 13 by structuring new lease contracts, 
and renegotiating existing lease contracts, to avoid capitalisation of leases.  There was 
evidence that more assets were bought, or constructed, instead of being leased and also 
evidence of changes in capital structure.  Imhoff and Thomas (1988) also examined capital 
structure changes in response to SFAS 13, documenting a systematic substitution from 
finance (capital) leases to operating leases and non-lease sources of finance.  In an 
Australian study, Godfrey and Warren (1995) found a similar substitution effect.  
However, in contrast with the US, companies did not appear to have renegotiated finance 
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 lease contracts to operating leases.  In the UK, Garrod (1989) found that managers reacted 
to the introduction of SSAP 21 by reducing their non-lease debt prior to first disclosure of 
their lease information. 
 
There are also several ex ante studies based on accounting numbers, specifically 
accounting ratios that are used as key performance indicators.  Nelson (1963) examined the 
impact of lease capitalization on the debt-equity ratio of eleven US companies, finding a 
significant change in the rankings.  Ashton (1985) estimated the effect of finance lease 
capitalization on six ratios for 23 UK companies, finding a significant impact only on the 
gearing ratio.  More recent studies focus on the impact of operating lease capitalization.  
Imhoff et al. (1991) develop a method for the constructive capitalization of operating 
leases, using this to estimate the impact on two ratios (return on assets and debt-equity 
ratio) for 14 US companies. Material differences are found for both high and low operating 
lease use companies.  A subsequent paper found the income effects to be substantial and 
unpredictable in direction (Imhoff et al., 1997). Beattie et al. (1998) and Goodacre (2003) 
analyse UK data using the Imhoff et al. (1991) method, adapted to suit the UK setting.  
Both studies examine nine ratios: profit margin, three return ratios, asset turnover and four 
gearing measures.  Beattie et al.’s  (1998) findings, based on 1994 data for 232 industrial 
and commercial companies, show a significant impact for all ratios except return on capital 
employed and interest cover.  One gearing measure showed a massive 260% change 
following capitalization.  The findings for the 102 companies in the retail sector were even 
more marked, with all nine ratios showing a significant change (Goodacre, 2003). 
Dresdner Kleinwort Benson (1998) examine the impact of operating lease capitalization on 
27 large UK retail companies, using a simple multiple of annual operating lease rental 
obligations.  It is reported that ‘net debt would be in excess of 100% of equity market 
capitalization in many cases’.  With the exception of Ashton (1985), which may be subject 
to sample selection bias, all studies reported significant impacts on ratios.  However the 
major impact is upon risk measures, rather than performance measures.   
 
Second, market-based studies are confined to the ex post study of rule changes, although it 
can be difficult to separate the impact of the event of interest from that of other 
confounding events.  There is mixed evidence of market price reaction to lease accounting 
information, and this derives from tests using rather old data (Ro, 1978; El-Gazzar, 1993; 
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 and Garrod, 1989).  There is also little evidence of an impact on market-based risk 
measures (Abdel-khalik, 1981; Finnerty et al., 1980).  Other market-based studies report 
quite strong evidence that the market already incorporates footnote operating lease 
disclosures in its assessment of equity risk in both the UK (Beattie et al., 2000) and the US 
(Bowman, 1980; Ely, 1995; Imhoff et al., 1993).4
 
Third, experimental studies explore how individual users process lease accounting 
information, in particular, whether they appear to be influenced by whether the information 
is recognised in the financial statements or merely disclosed in the footnotes to the 
accounts.  The evidence is, however, very mixed (Wilkins and Zimmer, 1983a and 1983b; 
Munter and Ratcliffe, 1983; Hartman and Sami, 1989; Breton and Taffler, 1995; and 
Gopalakrishnan and Parkash, 1996; and Wilkins, 1984). 
 
Survey research may also be used to evaluate the impact of rule changes.  Surveys can 
investigate, both ex post and ex ante, the perceptions of a range of interested groups and 
explore the attitudes and views that underpin changes in behavior.  We are aware of only 
two other surveys of lease accounting rules.  Taylor and Turley (1985) investigated the 
opinions of UK preparers on lease accounting following ED29, the exposure draft that 
preceded SSAP 21.  They found that only a minority of managers believed that internal 
financing or investment decisions would be significantly affected by the proposed 
accounting standard.  However, managers believed that users’ decisions, including risk 
assessment, were likely to be affected, suggesting that managers’ behavior could be 
influenced by information inductance.  Managers also anticipated that future lease 
contracts would be structured as operating leases to avoid capitalisation.5  Blake et al. 
(1995) surveyed a sample comprising participants attending a management development 
course in Spain (including preparers of accounts and bank analysts).  Spanish accounting 
rules have a more restrictive definition of a finance lease than found elsewhere, requiring 
that a purchase option exist.  The brief questionnaire was limited to several yes/no 
questions.  Preparers generally felt that the finance lease accounting rules would result in 
operating leases becoming more attractive and that all leases should be accounted for as 
rental agreements.  Bank analysts, however, did not feel that leasing activity would 
diminish, and a third felt that the definition of a finance lease should be expanded to 
include some agreements currently classified as operating. 
 9
  
2.4 Research questions 
The accounting standards quality literature suggests three broad issues to explore with 
interested parties: (i) views on the current accounting standard and on the G4+1 proposals 
for change; (ii)  views regarding a range of potential economic consequences; and (iii) 
factors that may explain the views held. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Sample selection 
The sample of account preparers was based on the population of industrial and commercial 
UK listed companies.  Industrial and commercial companies were selected on the basis that 
the majority of their leasing activity is conducted as lessees (financial companies were 
excluded on the basis that the majority of their leasing activity is conducted as lessors).  
Listed companies were selected on the basis of their economic significance.  The sampling 
frame used was the UKQI (UK quoted industrials) list on Datastream in June 2000.  The 
questionnaire was sent to finance directors of a systematic sample of one-third (415) of this 
population.  The survey of users was designed to focus on expert users (equity analysts) 
and to cover both sell-side and buy-side analysts. The user sample was drawn from two 
sources.  First, a systematic sample of 400 financial analysts was selected from a mailing 
list of the London-based Associate members (totalling 1,640) of the UK Society of 
Investment Professionals.  A further sample of 72 was taken from a listing of leading fund 
management firms published in CA Magazine (1999).   
 
3.2 Questionnaire design and administration procedures 
The first stage in designing the questionnaire was to review the (fairly limited) theoretical 
and empirical literature in the area, including previous surveys.  This, together with the 
ASB (1999) discussion paper, was used to produce a draft questionnaire that was sent out 
for piloting.  The draft questionnaire, accompanied by a covering letter, a set of pilot-
testing questions and a summary of the new proposals for lease accounting, was mailed to 
thirteen preparers and key contacts.  The pilot questions asked about subject matter, length, 
layout, instructions for completion and question ordering.  Useful comments were received 
from several finance directors, the ASB and the Finance & Leasing Association and the 
questionnaire content and terminology was revised accordingly.  The questionnaire 
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 generally used closed-form questions and adopted a five-point Likert scale with verbal 
anchors.  In total, the questionnaire was 8 pages long (including covers) and asked for 
responses to 76 question elements.  It was mailed out in 2000 (preparers) and 2001 
(users),accompanied by an explanatory covering letter that assured the confidentiality of 
responses and a one-page summary of the G4+1 proposals.  Many standard response-
enhancing techniques were adopted: clear questionnaire layout; piloting; covering letter 
addressed to a specific named individual (all finance director details were individually 
checked by telephone); covering letters signed individually by researchers; follow-up 
letters sent approximately 10 and 20 days after the initial request6; stamped reply 
envelopes (rather than reply-paid envelopes); non-respondents asked to return the 
questionnaire. 
 
3.3 Background characteristics affecting respondents’ views 
In most circumstances, more weight is attached to opinions expressed by knowledgeable 
individuals.  Given the technical, somewhat specialised, nature of lease accounting, it was 
considered important to check whether the mean response reflects the opinions of those 
who understand the technicalities.  The impact of respondents’ self-reported familiarity 
with the lease accounting proposals on views held was investigated for both groups, by 
splitting them into ‘familiar’ and ‘less-familiar’ sub-groups.7
 
It could be argued that companies with high levels of lease usage will anticipate a greater 
impact on their financial statements and more significant economic consequences under 
the G4+1 proposals.  To investigate this, the companies of preparer respondents were split 
into high and low operating lease usage groups based on whether ratio of operating lease 
rentals/sales fell above and below the median level, respectively. 
 
Preparer responses might also be associated with company size, since large and small 
companies typically have different financing mixes (Lasfer and Levis, 1998; Bevan and 
Danbolt, 2002), different negotiating power and different administrative capabilities.  
Responding companies were split into large and small sub-groups based on median total 
asset value.8
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 4. Results 
After describing response rates and tests for bias, respondents’ views are described under 
seven headings: accounting standards generally; deficiencies in the current lease 
accounting standard; general principles of the new proposals; specific issues; economic 
consequences; lease accounting alternatives; and implementation.  In some instances, we 
posed the same basic question in different ways, to guard against sensitivity to question 
wording. Where essentially the same responses were obtained, only one form of the 
question is reported here.  Some tables are presented using the logical question order 
appearing in the questionnaire, while others are ranked based on users’ responses.  
Significant differences (at the 5% level) in response associated with the three background 
characteristics identified as being of potential relevance (familiarity with the proposals, 
lease usage and company size) are reported at the end of each sub-section.9
 
4.1 Response rates and tests for bias 
For the preparer group, 78 usable responses were received representing a response rate of 
19%.  An additional 13 responses were received from those who requested a copy of the 
questionnaire when replying to a questionnaire on a related topic,10 giving a total of 91 
usable responses.  For the user group, 41 usable replies were received representing a 
response rate of 9%.  These rates are in line with other recent studies involving similar 
groups (see Beattie and Pratt, 2003, note 13 for a discussion).  Given that non-response is a 
significant, and increasing, problem in the survey method, relatively large initial samples 
were used to provide a satisfactory absolute number of responses to support meaningful 
statistical analysis.  The reasons given for non-completion suggest that the technical 
complexity of the lease accounting issue was a significant factor for the user group.11  
 
Three tests for response bias were performed, two relating only to the preparer group and 
the third relating to both respondent groups.12  First, responding preparer companies were 
compared with the population of UKQI companies on the basis of size (measured as total 
assets); a 2-tail t-test confirmed no difference between the sample and population means, 
even at the 10% significance level.  Second, responding companies were formed into seven 
broad industrial groups and a chi-squared test goodness-of-fit test confirmed that the 
sample companies were distributed similarly to companies in the UKQI population (chi-
squared = 5.92; p= 0.4321). 
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Finally, the responses of early responders were compared to those of late responders for 
both groups, on the assumption that late responders are similar to non-responders 
(Oppenheim, 1966).13  As there were no particularly ‘key’ questions in the questionnaire, a 
series of tests (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney) was conducted for each of the 74 closed-form 
question elements.  For the preparer group, no significant differences were observed.  For 
the user group, only 6 differences were observed out of 74, which is not indicative of any 
systematic difference between the early and late respondents. 
 
A further factor that can affect the validity of responses is the suitability of individual 
respondents, in terms of knowledge about the issues under investigation.  For the preparer 
group, virtually all of the respondents were senior financial personnel likely to be 
knowledgeable about the lease accounting issue.  All of the investment analysts were either 
active professionally qualified (IIMR members) or active senior fund management 
personnel, so are likely to be representative of expert investment professional users.  There 
were, however, significant differences between the groups’ declared familiarity with the 
lease accounting proposals, with 65% of the preparer group ‘moderately’ or ‘very’ familiar 
with the new proposals compared with only 34% of the user group (difference significant 
at the 1% level).  
 
4.2 Accounting standards generally 
Respondents’ views on lease accounting reform may be conditioned by their opinion of 
accounting standards in general (Taylor and Turley, 1985).  Opinions on accounting 
standards are, therefore, reported in Table 1, panel A.  The general need for accounting 
standards is almost universally supported, however preparers are, not surprisingly, more 
aware of the compliance burden.14  It appears, therefore, that the responses to questions 
concerning lease accounting are unlikely to be coloured by a disagreement with accounting 
standards in general.  Any difference in the perceived burden imposed on companies 
arising from the existing standard and the new proposals could, however, be an issue.  
Unsurprisingly, there were no significant differences in response associated with 
familiarity, operating lease usage or company size. 
[Table 1 about here] 
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 4.3 Deficiencies in current lease accounting standards  
In the development of high quality accounting standards, new proposals should, in addition 
to possessing certain other attributes, address a current deficiency (Imhoff, 1998).  
Respondents agreement with ten suggested deficiencies of SSAP 21, taken mainly from the 
G4+1 special report, are shown in Table 1, panel B, in descending order of agreement by 
the user group.  Most of the deficiencies also apply to IAS 17, however the questions in 
rows 1 and 3 relate specifically to the existence of a bright line in relation to lease 
classification. 
 
Both groups agreed that the current standard was open to manipulation, lacked uniformity, 
did not portray the substance of transactions, was incomplete, inconsistent and lacked 
clarity (rows 1-5; 8, 9).  It is of note that while users did believe that their decision-making 
was impaired by these deficiencies, preparers did not (rows 6, 7, 10).  The user group also 
felt significantly more strongly than the preparer group about the difficulty of estimating 
the balance sheet impact of operating leases (row 2), and was more concerned about the 
subjectivity of lease classification (row 10).   
 
The primary deficiency of SSAP 21 identified by both groups (that lease transactions could 
be deliberately structured for classification as operating leases – row 1) was recognised 
more keenly by ‘familiar’ preparers (‘familiar’ group mean = 4.26; ‘less familiar’ group 
mean = 3.82).  There were no other significant differences. 
 
4.4 Lease accounting proposals: general principles  
The approach in the G4+1 discussion paper is grounded in the definitions of assets and 
liabilities and seeks to improve information for users’ decision-making.  The general 
principles focus on recognising the substance of leasing transactions and the application of 
uniform methods across all leases.  Respondents were asked the extent of their agreement 
with these general normative principles and their views are summarised in Table 2.  Row 1 
deals with the general principle that there should be one accounting method for all leasing 
transaction.  This is amplified to confirm that the method should apply to land and 
buildings and to intangible assets (rows 2-3).  The final two rows focus on whether a de 
minimis threshold should apply to leases or whether the general concept of materiality is 
sufficient. 
 14
 [Table 2 about here] 
The user group was in favour of all of these general principles.  However, the preparer 
group was far less positive, on average and exhibited high variability.  There was relatively 
moderate agreement, on average, with just two of the principles (rows 1 and 4).  Thus, 
while recognising the deficiencies of SSAP 21, preparers were not particularly supportive 
of the general principles of reform.  This could stem from opposition to the G4+1 
proposals per se, or aversion to any form of change, a manifestation of the status quo bias 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988).  Moreover, opposition to the G4+1 proposals could 
arise either from opposition to the conceptual basis of the principles or from expected 
adverse economic consequences for their companies should the new proposals form the 
basis of a new lease accounting standard.  
 
There was only one significant difference associated with background characteristics.  
Preparers in companies with low lease usage favoured the application of a single method to 
all tangible assets, including land and buildings (mean = 3.44), whereas those in companies 
with high operating lease usage opposed this (mean = 2.68).  Perhaps preparers with few 
property leases are more concerned with administrative simplicity than balance sheet 
impact (and vice versa for those with high exposure to property leases). 
 
4.5 Lease accounting proposals: specific issues 
While high quality accounting standards should preferably be based on concepts rather 
than arbitrary rules, supplementary rules are usually necessary to limit alternatives and 
ensure consistency of application.  The G4+1 discussion paper considers and recommends 
ways of dealing with some of the complexities of lease contracts, specifically the treatment 
of renewal options, contingent rentals and rentals that vary in line with prices.   
 
4.5.1 Renewal options 
There are two main differences between SSAP 21 and the G4+1 proposals.  Under SSAP 
21, a renewal option (if reasonably likely to be exercised) is included in determining the 
lease term for classifying agreements as finance or operating leases.  For a finance lease in 
which the exercise of a renewal option is reasonably certain, the present value of lease 
rentals payable in the initial period and the renewal period would generally appear on the 
balance sheet.  While the G4+1 proposals would require the present value of all material 
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 lease agreements to be recorded on the balance sheet, they suggest that renewal options 
should not be anticipated.15  Thus only the present value of rentals payable in the initial 
period would appear on the balance sheet and hence shorter guaranteed terms could 
actually reduce balance sheet obligations for leases that are currently classified as finance 
leases. 
 
Second, SSAP 21 makes no distinction between the renewal option and the value of the 
right to use the asset, whereas the G4+1 document proposes that the two should be 
recorded separately on the balance sheet, to highlight the flexibility of different lease 
agreement arrangements.  It is proposed that option values could be ascertained through 
direct comparison with similar lease agreements without options. 
 
Table 3, panel A provides a summary of responses concerning renewal options.  Both 
groups are neutral regarding the benchmark SSAP 21 treatment (row 1).  Preparers’ views 
regarding the new proposals are both stronger and significantly different from those of 
users, with preparers agreeing that renewal options should not be anticipated but 
disagreeing that options should be recorded separately.  The latter view may arise from the 
perceived difficulties of valuing the option.  Preparers do not think that option values can 
be established by comparison with similar agreements; users are neutral.  However, both 
groups envisage significant compliance costs (especially preparers) and the negotiation of 
shorter initial lease terms.  The technical complexity of the treatment of renewal options 
may be contributing to the general neutrality (uncertainty) of the user group. 
 
There were two significant differences relating to background characteristics.  First, 
although both the high and low operating lease usage sub-groups agreed that the exercise 
of renewal options should not be anticipated, high users were in stronger agreement (mean 
= 3.91 (high); 3.49 (low); row 2).  Second, while preparers were neutral, on average, to the 
recording of renewal option assets and liabilities at the start of the lease, small company 
preparers were against the suggestion (mean = 2.54 (small); mean = 3.05 (large); row 1).   
[Table 3 about here] 
4.5.2 Contingent rentals 
Under SSAP 21, lease rentals contingent on asset usage or lessee revenues/profits are not 
included in the minimum lease payments used for lease classification, nor are they 
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 included in the capitalised value of finance leases recorded in the balance sheet.  Similarly, 
under the G4+1 proposals, contingent rentals based on asset usage would not generally be 
anticipated but would be charged as an expense when the contingency arises.  An 
exception to this general rule would be when the minimum lease payments are 
unrepresentative of the value of property rights conveyed, in which case a greater amount 
reflecting the value of such rights would be recognised.  It is expected that this exception 
would be the norm in the case of contingent rentals based on lessee revenues or profits 
(para. 4.67).  The proposals suggest that the value of property rights conveyed by a lease 
agreement with contingent rentals might be determined by comparison with lease 
payments for a similar agreement without contingent rentals.  Respondents’ views are 
shown in Table 3, panel B.  
 
Only preparers agreed with the G4+1 proposal that contingent rentals generally should not 
be recognised on the balance sheet (row 1), and disagreed with the opposing view that 
estimated contingent rentals should be recorded on the balance sheet (row 2).  Users were 
neutral to both options, on average, although there was wide dispersion in views.  Both 
groups were neutral to the ‘unrepresentativeness’ exception to the non-recognition rule 
(row 3).  This may reflect the difficulty associated with estimation of fair value, as 
preparers in particular did not believe that the G4+1 method of comparison with non-
contingent agreements is valid (rows 4 and 5).  These results suggest that the difficulties 
associated with estimating the value of future contingent rentals contribute to the view that 
contingent rentals should not be recognised on balance sheet.  There were no significant 
differences relating to background characteristics. 
 
4.5.3 Rentals that vary in line with prices (e.g., upwards-only rent reviews on leased land 
and buildings) 
70% of property leases granted in 2002-03 contain a five-yearly review (BPF IPD, 2003).  
Under SSAP 21, any associated variation in lease rentals is not anticipated at the beginning 
of the lease term, but treated as an increase/decrease in liability in the period in which the 
price change occurs.  The G4+1 consensus is that the likely future price changes should be 
estimated at the start of the lease contract and incorporated in the calculation of the present 
value of minimum lease payments, to ensure that the difference in values for lease 
agreements with and without rent reviews are not misleading.  However, the ASB 
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 dissented from this view on the grounds that estimates of future price increases would be 
unreliable.  Respondents’ views are shown in Table 3, panel C.   
 
Users’ views were widely dispersed though, on average, neutral.  Preparers agreed with the 
SSAP 21 treatment (row 1) and disagreed with the alternative G4+1 proposal (row 2).  The 
perceived unreliability of estimating future price rises seems to be a major reason for this 
view (row 3).   
 
In relation to background characteristics, familiarity had a significant impact on views, 
with those who best appreciate the issue (i.e. respondents ‘familiar’ with lease accounting) 
having stronger views.  In particular, ‘familiar’ users disagreed with recognition based 
only on rentals at the beginning of the lease whereas ‘less familiar’ users agreed (‘familiar’ 
group mean = 2.50; ‘less familiar’ group mean = 3.40; row 1).  Thus, the views of 
‘familiar’ users were diametrically opposed to the views of all preparers (preparer mean = 
3.71).  In addition, ‘familiar’ preparers strongly disagreed with recognising rental estimates 
(‘familiar’ group mean = 2.36; ‘less familiar’ group mean = 2.83; row 2).  This 
differentiates the views of this preparer sub-group even more from the views of all users 
(user mean = 3.00). 
 
4.6 Economic consequences 
Potential economic consequences were identified from the G4+1 discussion paper (ASB, 
1999), from published responses to this (Finance & Leasing Association, 1999) and from 
prior research (Taylor and Turley, 1985; Beattie et al., 1998).  Respondents’ views were 
elicited using two multi-part questions, the first covering all leased assets and the second 
focussing specifically on land and buildings (to deal with some consequences that are 
specific to land and buildings).  
 
4.6.1 Consequences of adopting the lease accounting proposals: all assets 
Respondent’s views are shown in Table 4, panel A, in descending order of user group 
agreement. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Not surprisingly, both respondent groups fully recognised that many operating leases 
would give rise to assets and liabilities on the balance sheet (row 1) and that this would 
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 lead to an increase in reported measures of gearing (row 2), consistent with prior empirical 
research (Beattie et al., 1998).16  Both groups also agreed that companies may need to 
renegotiate borrowing covenants although preparers’ level of agreement was significantly 
stronger than that of users (row 6).  Technical violation of accounting-based debt 
covenants is costly.  Beneish and Press (1993) estimate that the average costs range 
between 1.2% and 2% of equity market value, or between 4.4% and 7.3% of the 
outstanding balances of the violated debt agreements.  There were also similar levels of 
agreement by both groups that credit rating would fall for some companies (row 8). 
 
Certain consequences impact primarily on lessees/lessors.  Both groups agreed that lease 
terms would shorten to minimise lessees’ balance sheet obligations (row 9).  This suggests 
a transfer of risk to lessors from lessees, so would be of some benefit to lessee companies.  
However only preparers thought that lease finance would be less attractive (row 11), 
although they were neutral about whether this would affect UK investment and leasing 
volumes (row 16), and disagreed that new assets would be purchased (or constructed) 
rather than leased (row 14).  By contrast, users disagreed that investment and leasing 
volumes would be affected and were neutral the impact on purchase decisions.  This might 
suggest that, although less attractive, lease finance would still compare favourably with 
alternative sources of finance.  Alternatively, it might suggest that companies don’t always 
have the choice between purchase/construction and leasing.  The use of specific assets may 
only be available in one form or the other.  General comments made by the respondents 
provide some indication of this being the case (for example, “the alternative to leasing isn’t 
always available” and “the properties we operate from are only available on lease”).   
 
Users agreed significantly more strongly than preparers that users’ assessments of 
companies would be improved (rows 3 and 4) if the proposals were adopted.  This is 
somewhat inconsistent with preparers rejection that the current accounting standard 
impairs users’ assessments (Table 1).  Users agreed that they would increase risk estimates, 
though they were neutral that the assessment of either debt-paying ability or dividend-
paying ability would be affected (rows 5, 13 and 15). Preparers were neutral to the first two 
consequences, but did think that dividend-paying ability would be adversely affected.   
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 Users were neutral regarding the effect on administrative burdens and compliance costs, 
whereas preparers agreed that these would increase significantly (rows 10 and 11).  
Finally, users agreed that the proposals would reflect the financial flexibility of different 
leasing arrangements, while preparers disagreed (row 7). 
 
This set of responses highlights the fact that it is the economic consequences relating to 
company risk (and the perception of it) that are of prime importance in the debate on lease 
accounting reform.  The increase in measured levels of gearing would affect debt 
covenants, lease terms, credit ratings, financing choices and users’ assessment of company 
risk.  
 
4.6.2 Consequences of adopting the lease accounting proposals: land and buildings 
The proposed new approach to lease accounting would have a major impact on property 
leases (i.e., land and buildings).  Under SSAP 21, such leases are generally treated as off-
balance sheet operating leases, since the landlord lessor retains a significant residual 
interest in the property.  Under the G4+1 proposals, the present value of future rentals and 
an estimate of future increases would be recorded on the lessee’s balance sheet.  The views 
of respondents on various potential consequences of the new proposals being applied to the 
leasing of land and buildings are shown in Table 4, panel B, in descending order of user 
group agreement. The question in row 7 is reiterated in the specific context of land and 
buildings; the other potential consequences are peculiar to land and buildings. 
 
The new proposals suggest that balance sheet recognition of the rights and obligations to 
occupy leased property would enable any loss on leased property to be written off when it 
occurs rather than on vacation of the property, and any increase in value arising from sub-
leasing at a higher rent to be shown.  Both groups of respondents appear to support these 
arguments (rows 1 and 2).  Consistent with the general trends observed in Table 4, panel 
A, the difficulty and costs involved in estimating the present value of future property rent 
increases (row 3) were not recognised by users, but were strongly identified by preparers.  
The G4+1 discussion paper suggests that an estimate of the fair value of a property lease 
subject to rent reviews might be obtained by comparison with a similar property lease that 
was not subject to rent reviews.  However, according to the Finance and Leasing 
Association (FLA) in their response to the new proposals, virtually no such leases exist in 
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 the UK.  Preparers recognised that the combined profit and loss expense of depreciation 
and interest would exceed market rent in the early years of the lease agreement (row 4); 
perhaps surprisingly, users did not appreciate this fact. 
 
The FLA suggests that rent yields may rise to reflect an increase in lessors’ risk and that it 
may be difficult to fund new property development without the security of long-term 
tenants.  On average, both groups were neutral to these possible property market 
consequences (rows 5 and 6); their views on rent yields are surprising and may not be 
shared by landlords.  The purchase of property instead of leasing was considered unlikely 
by both groups (row 7), the views being stronger than in the case of assets generally (Table 
4, panel A).  Perhaps the choice to purchase specific properties is not an option, as they are 
already owned by institutions or property companies who wish to retain them for renting to 
tenants. 
 
4.6.3 Background characteristics 
The impact on respondent views of three background characteristics (familiarity with the 
G4+1 proposals, level of company lease usage and company size) was examined.  Seven 
significant differences existed.  (In considering these, it should be borne in mind that, when 
conducting multiple individual tests, some random differences are likely to emerge as 
statistically significant.)  First, although users were neutral overall to the view that 
companies would find it difficult and expensive to estimate the present value of future 
property rent increases, ‘familiar’ users disagreed (‘familiar’ group mean = 2.54; ‘less 
familiar’ group mean = 3.28; panel B, row 3).  The level of operating lease usage gave rise 
to two differences: the view that leasing will become less attractive was driven by low 
lease usage preparers (mean = 3.18 (high); mean = 3.57 (low); panel A, row 12), whereas 
disagreement with the view that companies would buy rather than lease property was 
driven by high lease usage preparers (mean = 2.58 (high); mean = 2.97 (low); panel B, row 
7).  There are two possible, non-mutually exclusive, explanations for these different 
opinions.  First, high lease usage companies may believe that they have chosen lease 
finance for sound commercial reasons that will not be greatly affected by the change in 
accounting treatment.  Nevertheless, they would still prefer to keep their leased assets, 
particularly land and buildings, off-balance sheet.  Second, high lease usage companies 
may perceive that they are in a stronger bargaining position with lessors, compared to low 
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 lease usage companies.  Thus, they may expect to be able to negotiate relatively more 
favourable terms (such as shorter leases with renewal options or break clauses) in response 
to any new accounting requirements.  In other words, they expect leasing to continue to be 
an attractive form of finance but would like flexibility within any new accounting standard 
to enable them to minimise the impact on their financial statements. 
 
The remaining four significant differences concerned company size.  Large companies 
were more acutely aware than those in small companies of the need to renegotiate bond 
covenants (mean = 4.13 (large); 3.79 (small); panel A, row 6), perhaps because large 
companies are likely to have greater exposure to securitised long-term debt (Lasfer and 
Levis, 1998; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002).  On the other hand, small companies showed 
greater concern over the expected increase in administrative burdens (mean = 3.83 (small); 
3.42 (large); panel A, row 10) and compliance costs (mean = 3.86 (small); 3.51 (large); 
Table 4, panel A, row 11).  Presumably, small companies have a smaller administrative 
team over which to spread such matters. 
 
Further, large companies agreed more strongly that lease terms would shorten (mean = 
3.62 (large); mean = 3.15(small); panel A, row 9), presumably reflecting the relative 
bargaining power that large firms have in contract negotiations.  Finally, large companies 
tended to agree that ‘companies would be reluctant to enter long property leases making it 
difficult to fund new property development’ in contrast to small companies who disagreed 
(mean = 3.37 (large); mean = 2.77 (small); panel B, row 8).  This may reflect large 
company views on the first, rather than the second, part of the statement.  There is 
anecdotal evidence that companies may wish to negotiate shorter lease contracts for 
commercial rather than accounting reasons.  Large companies may find this easier to 
accomplish than small companies in view of their stronger negotiating position.  
 
4.7 Lease accounting alternatives 
The UK Finance & Leasing Association suggested an ‘improved’ version of SSAP 21 in 
which the arbitrary 90% classification test for finance leases of SSAP 21 would be reduced 
to 75%.  They argue that this would bring the vast majority of UK operating leases onto 
the balance sheet while retaining the existing principles that are widely understood.  The 
SSAP 21 and G4+1 treatments are also included to serve as benchmarks.  We also asked 
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 about increased footnote disclosure and full capitalisation without any additional 
disclosure.  Responses are shown in Table 5, panel A, in descending order of user 
agreement. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Users agreed with the G4+1 treatment, disagreed with the SSAP 21 treatment and were 
neutral to changing the classification threshold (rows 2-4).  Both groups agreed that lease 
commitments should be analysed by asset type, as already practised in the UK, but not in 
all countries (row 1).  On the other hand, both groups disagreed with the suggestion that 
capitalisation made additional disclosure unnecessary (row 5).  Although users were 
neutral overall to the 75% threshold alternative, ‘familiar’ users disagreed (‘familiar’ group 
mean = 2.50; ‘less familiar’ group mean = 3.13; panel A, row 2). 
 
4.8 Implementation of the lease accounting proposals 
Respondents were asked their opinion on four alternatives for implementing the new 
proposals – immediate implementation for all leases and three different transition 
arrangements.  Responses are summarised in Table 5, panel B. 
 
Users favoured immediate implementation to new and existing leases (row 1) perhaps to 
minimise the disruption and uncertainty associated with multiple change points and also to 
benefit immediately from the improved information.  They disagreed with the suggestion 
of a transition period in which operating lease capitalisation would be required for new 
leases only (row 4) and were neutral about disclosure of capitalised values.  Preparers 
disagreed with all four alternatives, although this may simply reflect their disagreement 
with the general principles of the proposals.  Preparers’ views varied highly, however.  
There were no significant differences relating to background characteristics. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
This paper reports the findings from a questionnaire survey of UK users and preparers 
regarding lease accounting reform.  In common with all research methods, the survey 
method used in the present study suffers from a number of limitations that must be borne 
in mind when evaluating the results.  There are three principal potential limitations: (i) 
non-response bias, which can mean that the findings are not generalizable to the population 
of interest; (ii) uninformed respondent bias, which means that the respondent does not 
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 possess the appropriate knowledge or experience to answer the questions posed; and (iii) 
the risk that respondents do not answer with complete honestly.  A further limitation of the 
study is that, as respondents were confined to UK subjects, the results cannot be 
generalized beyond the UK, especially where there are significant institutional differences.  
One might speculate, for example, that the views of users in less active capital markets to 
that in the UK (and US) would differ less from those of preparers.  The extent of variation 
in the views of users and preparers across countries is also of interest.17  Further research 
conducted in other jurisdictions could usefully be undertaken to investigate these issues. 
 
This survey has shown that the current UK lease accounting standard, which is 
representative of many extant lease standards worldwide in key respects, is recognised as 
deficient in a number of respects by both users and preparers, thereby failing to meet the 
criteria for a high quality accounting standard.  In particular, they agreed that it allows 
transactions to be deliberately structured for classification as off-balance sheet operating 
leases, thereby enabling similar transactions to be accounted for in different ways.  
However, preparers did not believe that this impaired various user decisions. 
 
Expert users were strongly in favour of the general principles in the G4+1 proposals.  
However, preparers were far less positive, showing only moderate support for just two of 
the principles (that all material leases should be recognised on the lessee’s balance sheet 
and that one accounting method should apply to all lease transactions).  The G4+1 
discussion paper makes specific proposals for the treatment of renewal options, contingent 
rentals and rentals that vary in line with prices.  While the views of users were generally 
neutral, preparers were against the proposals, instead favouring the treatment of these 
issues in the current standard.  The main arguments against the detailed proposals seemed 
to be based on cost-benefit considerations and concerns about their operationality.  Given 
that the preparers (companies) initially bear the costs and users (analysts and others) are 
more likely to reap the direct benefits from improved financial information, the differing 
responses from preparers and users are understandable.  The attitude of preparers is 
entirely consistent with the arguments put forward by Parfet (2000) who suggests that 
accounting standards ‘are overhead, not something a customer consumes and will pay for’ 
(p. 483).  Consequently, business responds toward new accounting rules with a ‘healthy 
negative bias’, which is ‘one of the healthy checks and balances in the great standard 
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 setting system we have’ (p. 483; p. 484).  However, preparers’ expressed views may ignore 
any potential, indirect, long-term benefits that companies may enjoy from improved 
user/market confidence as a result of the improved information (e.g., reduced costs of 
finance).  Accounting standard setters act as arbiter between those who might benefit from 
the improved information and those who will incur the costs of providing the information.   
 
Another challenge faced by accounting standard setters is to identify the economic 
consequences that may result from a change in accounting standards, estimate their 
magnitude and then take them into account.  The current paper contributes by asking key 
interested parties what they believe will be the consequences if the G4+1 proposals are 
adopted.  There was clear acceptance by both users and preparers that additional assets and 
liabilities would be brought on to the balance sheet under the new proposals and that this 
would impact on reported gearing.  This was considered likely to lead to: re-negotiation of 
borrowing covenants; a reduction in credit ratings for some companies; improved users’ 
evaluation of long-term financial commitments; and improved company comparisons.  
Additional compliance costs and administrative burdens relating to lease accounting were 
anticipated by preparers (particularly from smaller companies), but not by users.  
 
Both groups believed that lease terms would become shorter to minimise balance sheet 
obligations and some preparers (from low operating lease usage companies), but not users, 
also believed that the proposals would make lease finance less attractive.  However, neither 
group believed that the proposals would adversely affect UK investment and leasing 
volumes in the short-term, nor that they would substantially change the UK property 
market.  In particular, the purchase of property rather than leasing was considered unlikely, 
probably because the purchase alternative is not always available.  Overall, respondents 
anticipated significant economic consequences if the proposals are incorporated in a new 
lease accounting standard. 
 
Alternatives to the new proposals were explored but none appeared to be favoured by 
preparers.  They were neutral to the current SSAP 21 treatment and to disclosure (rather 
than recognition) approaches, while opposing a 75% threshold for finance leases, and the 
suggestion of capitalisation in the balance sheet without footnote disclosure of other 
material aspects.  By contrast, users clearly favoured the G4+1 proposals.  Immediate 
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 implementation of the new proposals to new and existing leases was favored by the user 
group, implying that a ‘clean break’ would be preferred over a transition period.  Preparers 
disagreed with all four of the alternative suggestions for implementation, probably 
reflecting general disagreement with the new proposals per se. 
 
The findings of the present study demonstrate very clearly that the views of expert users 
and preparers differ significantly.  This suggests that the interests of these two groups’ 
conflict and standard-setters must address this. These group differences also show that 
concerns about the general under-representation of users’ views on accounting standards 
are well-founded.  By examining the views of representatives from both key constituencies 
(users and preparers), investigating the impact of background characteristics on those 
views, and covering a range of key reform issues (e.g. general principles, economic 
consequences, implementation), the ex ante evidence presented here provides a more 
balanced and comprehensive set of views in support of the standard setting process than 
has hitherto been available.   
 
The findings also provide further evidence that lease accounting standards currently in 
force worldwide are not perceived as being of high quality.  It is shown that the distinction 
between operating and finance leases is not generally believed to be a useful principle on 
which to base a standard.  The distinction is not clear-cut and hence the detailed accounting 
rules that emerge are inherently unsatisfactory.  The principle upon which there is 
widespread agreement is that all material rights and obligations arising from lease contracts 
should be recognised on the balance sheet.  It is the detailed implementation guidance 
associated with this principle that is the subject of most debate.  Further research to explore 
the detailed nature of lease contracts across different jurisdictions and investigate the 
economic consequences of adopting different detailed implementation guidance would 
further assist in the process of lease accounting reform. Ultimately, however, it will be the 
responsibility of the standard setters to balance conceptual principles and economic 
consequences and also to resolve the conflicts of interest that exist between the key 
interested parties (Cyert and Ijiri, 1974). 
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 Notes 
 
                                                 
1 This relates to 2002/03 year-ends. Mean figures are even higher: 0.70 and 95.3, respectively. 
 
2 The G4+1 group of standard-setters (now a defunct body) comprised the standard-setting bodies of 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US, as well as the IASC. 
 
3 Under SFAS 13, the total minimum future operating lease rentals are shown separately for each of the first 
five years and combined thereafter.  Under SSAP 21, it is only the next year’s (rather than total) minimum 
future operating lease rentals that must be disclosed, analysed according to the period in which the annual 
commitment expires (less than one year, two to five years and more than five years).  This is further analysed 
by asset category (‘land and buildings’ and ‘other assets’). 
 
4 Further, there is evidence that at least some investment analysts and credit rating agencies recast financial 
statements by calculating the assets and liabilities implicit in off-balance sheet operating leases (e.g., 
Dresdner Kleinwort Benson, 1998). 
 
5 A similar response was reported by Drury and Braund (1990) in their (post-SSAP 21) general survey of the 
leasing decision. 
 
6 Each questionnaire contained an identifying number to allow non-respondents to be followed up; thus the 
responses were confidential but not anonymous. 
 
7 Respondents were asked to self-assess their level of familiarity with the new lease accounting proposals by 
selecting one of four categories.  The categories ‘very familiar’ and ‘moderately familiar’ were subsequently 
combined to form the ‘familiar’ sub-group, while the categories ‘slightly familiar’ and ‘not at all familiar’ 
were combined to form the ‘less- familiar’ sub-group. 
 
8 Data for these additional tests were all extracted from Datastream. 
 
9 Selected key findings are summarised in a practitioner-oriented report published by the ICAEW that 
overviews a range of studies in the area of leasing (Beattie et al., 2004).   
 
10 A questionnaire investigating ‘leasing and corporate financing decisions’ was sent out over a similar time 
period to the remaining two-thirds of the UKQI (UK quoted industrials) population. Respondents to this 
survey were invited to request the ‘lease accounting reform’ questionnaire and 13 requested and completed 
the questionnaire. 
 
11 Including 136 negative responses from the investment analysts, the overall response rate was 38%. 
Interestingly, the major reasons for negative response were insufficient knowledge of lease accounting (47%) 
and lack of time/too busy (40%). 
 
12 These tests suffer from a number of well-known limitations; see Wallace and Mellor (1988) and Wallace 
and Cooke (1990) for discussions. 
 
13 Responses were classified into three approximately equal sized groups (early, middle and late), according 
to the date that their completed questionnaire was received. 
 
14  Opinion varies regarding whether it is better to use parametric or non-parametric statistical tests on 
responses from Likert-type scales. Strictly, a Likert scale is not an interval scale and so the more conservative 
non-parametric tests should be used. In practice, however, the results of both forms of test are very similar 
and so the more familiar and tractable parametric versions are commonly used. Studies involving Likert 
scales that use parametric tests include Bebbington et al. (1994), Yap (1997) and Hermanson (2000), while 
Deegan and Rankin (1999) use non-parametric tests exclusively. 
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15 The use of ‘break clauses’ is more common in the UK commercial property market than ‘renewal options’ 
but the effect is very similar.  These break clauses can be used to give the lessee an option to exit the lease 
contract at various stages during the contract (e.g., every five years). It is, in effect, an option to ‘not renew’.  
 
16 These consequences have likely indirect economic consequences because of the impact on matters such as 
breach of debt covenants, which affect cash flows. 
 
17 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these points to us. 
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 Table 1: Views on accounting standards generally and suggested deficiencies in 
extant leasing standards 
 
Panel A: Accounting standards generally 
 
  
 
Mean2,3
(std. dev.) 
 
 Question asked (abbreviated)1a Users Preparers 
(n=91) 
Diff.4
 Accounting standards are:    
1. an undesirable and unnecessary intrusion into company activities  1.34*** 
(0.83) 
1.51*** 
(0.80) 
ns 
2. desirable and impose no significant burden on companies 3.34 
(1.24) 
2.67** 
(1.19) 
0.01 
3. desirable but do impose a significant burden on companies 3.27 
(1.15) 
3.70*** 
(1.10) 
0.05 
 
Panel B: Suggested deficiencies in the current lease accounting standards 
 
  
 
 
n 
Mean2,3
(std. dev.) 
Preparer 
rank1b
 
 Question asked (abbreviated)1b Users Prep, Users Preparers  Diff.4
 To what extent do you agree with the following 
suggested deficiencies in SSAP 21? 
      
1. Permits leasing transactions to be deliberately 
structure for classification as operating leases 
 87 4.16*** 
(0.72) 
4.12*** 
(0.85) 
1 ns 
2. Requires estimation of balance sheet impact of 
operating leases based on limited information 
 85 4.13*** 
(0.70) 
3.42*** 
(0.85) 
5 0.01 
3. Substantially similar leasing transactions can be 
accounted for in different ways 
 87 4.08*** 
(0.62) 
3.91*** 
(0.82) 
2 ns 
4. No balance sheet recognition of material operating 
lease assets and liabilities 
 88 3.98*** 
(0.89) 
3.81*** 
(1.04) 
3 ns 
5. No single accounting method applicable to all leases  88 3.90*** 
(1.01) 
3.61*** 
(0.98) 
4 ns 
6. Impairs users’ comparison between companies  88 3.73*** 
(1.01) 
3.21 
(1.11) 
8 0.05 
7. Impairs users’ evaluation of lessees’ financial 
commitments 
 88 3.72*** 
(0.97) 
3.07 
(1.05) 
9 0.01 
8. Lease classification requires difficult and subjective 
judgements 
 88 3.68*** 
(0.86) 
3.28*** 
(0.98) 
6 0.05 
9. Inconsistency with substance over form principle FRS 
5) 
 82 3.53*** 
(0.80) 
3.26** 
(1.08) 
7 ns 
10. Impairs users’ estimation of risks involved in 
providing finance to lessee companies 
 84 3.38** 
(0.92) 
2.77** 
(1.00) 
10 0.01 
 
Notes 
1. a. Table is presented using the logical question order appearing in the questionnaire 
b. Table is ranked by mean response of users; Preparer rank = rank of preparers’ mean response 
2. Response categories are: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree 
3. Significance of t-test of whether mean response is significantly different from 3 = neutral; 
*** and ** = significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively (2-tail test) 
4. P-value from a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for significant difference between respondent group medians; 
significance levels of 5% and 1% are reported (2-tail test); ns = not significant. 
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 Table 2: Views on the general principles in the G4+1 lease accounting proposals 
 
  
 
 
n 
Mean2,3
(std. dev.) 
 
 Question asked (abbreviated)1a Users Preparers Users Preparers Diff.4
 To what extent do you agree with the following 
principles in the proposed approach to lease 
accounting? 
     
1. One accounting method should be applicable to 
all leasing transactions 
 90 3.72*** 
(1.07) 
3.32** 
(1.25) 
ns 
2. A lease accounting method should apply to all 
types of tangible asset, including land and 
buildings 
 89 3.74*** 
(1.02) 
3.07 
(1.27) 
0.01 
3. A lease accounting method should be equally 
applicable to leases of intangible and tangible 
assets 
 87 3.33** 
(0.96) 
3.01 
(1.13) 
ns 
4. All material leases should give rise to an asset 
and liability on the lessee’s balance sheet 
 90 3.95*** 
(0.81) 
3.27** 
(1.23) 
0.01 
5. A lease accounting method should not contain a 
threshold to exclude short leases; this should be 
addressed by the concept of materiality 
 90 3.67*** 
(0.86) 
2.96 
(1.15) 
0.01 
 
Notes: See Table 1 
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 Table 3: Views on the specific G4+1 proposals 
 
Panel A: Renewal options 
 
  
 
 
n 
Mean2,3
(std. dev.) 
 
 Question asked (abbreviated)1a Users Preparers Users Preparers Diff.4
 To what extent do you agree with the following?      
1. Estimates of probable amounts paid under options should be 
recorded as an asset and liability at beginning of lease 
 81 3.14 
(0.86) 
2.83 
(1.06) 
ns 
2. Exercise of renewal options should not be anticipated  83 3.31 
(1.04) 
3.71*** 
(0.86) 
0.05 
3. Renewal options of significant value should be recorded as 
a separate asset and liability 
 79 3.29** 
(0.83) 
2.57*** 
(1.01) 
0.01 
4. Renewal option value can be reliably ascertained by 
comparison with similar agreements without options 
 79 3.14 
(0.81) 
2.66*** 
(1.00) 
0.01 
5. Significant compliance costs would be involved in 
obtaining option valuations 
 81 3.38** 
(1.09) 
4.03*** 
(0.84) 
0.01 
6. Negotiation of short terms of limited asset usage that 
incorporate renewal options could ensure future 
requirements and minimise balance sheet obligations 
 73 3.52*** 
(0.78) 
3.46*** 
(0.76) 
ns 
 
Panel B: Contingent rentals 
 
  
 
 
n 
Mean2,3
(std. dev.) 
 
 Question asked (abbreviated)1a Users Preparers Users Preparers Diff.4
 To what extent do you agree with the following?      
1. No balance sheet recognition of contingent lease rentals; 
they should be expensed when revenue/profits arise 
 87 3.08 
(1.21) 
3.69*** 
(1.00) 
0.01 
2. Estimates of probable amounts paid should be recorded on 
the balance sheet 
 87 3.08 
(1.01) 
2.48*** 
(1.00) 
0.01 
3. If minimum lease rentals are unrepresentative, the fair value 
of property rights conveyed should be recognised on the 
balance sheet 
 87 3.28 
(1.00) 
2.94 
(0.94) 
ns 
4. Fair value of property rights conveyed can be ascertained by 
comparison with similar lease agreements excluding the 
contingency 
 79 2.97 
(0.86) 
2.77** 
(1.01) 
ns 
5. It is incorrect to compare with similar agreements excluding 
contingency; contingent element restricts asset use making 
the lease less valuable 
 76 3.58*** 
(0.83) 
3.29*** 
(0.88) 
ns 
 
Panel C: Rentals that vary in line with prices 
 
  
 
 
n 
Mean2,3
(std. dev.) 
 
 Question asked (abbreviated)1a Users Preparers Users Preparers Diff.4
 To what extent do you agree with the following?      
1. Assets and liabilities should be recognised on basis of 
rentals applicable at beginning of lease term 
 87 3.08 
(1.20) 
3.71*** 
(1.08) 
0.01 
2. Assets and liabilities should be recognised on basis of 
estimates of rentals that will actually be paid 
 87 3.00 
(1.07) 
2.52*** 
(1.09) 
0.05 
3. Estimates of liabilities arising through rising prices cannot 
be measured reliably 
 88 3.13 
(1.17) 
3.81*** 
(1.08) 
ns 
Notes: See Table 1 
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 Table 4: Views on the consequences of adopting the G4+1 lease accounting 
proposals 
 
Panel A: All assets 
 
  
 
 
n 
Mean2,3
(std. dev.) 
Preparer 
rank1b
 
 Question asked (abbreviated)1b Users Preparers Users Preparers  Diff.4
 To what extent do you agree that the 
following are direct or indirect 
consequences or recording all material 
leases on the lessee’s balance sheet? 
      
1. Many operating leases would give rise to 
assets and liabilities on the balance sheet 
 89 4.16*** 
(0.55) 
4.36*** 
(0.59) 
1 ns 
2. Reported measures of gearing would 
increase 
 88 4.13*** 
(0.66) 
4.18*** 
(0.83) 
2 ns 
3. Users’ evaluation of long term finance 
commitment of lessees would improve 
 87 3.89*** 
(0.69) 
3.38*** 
(1.00) 
7 0.01 
4. Users’ ability to compare companies 
would improve 
 85 3.76*** 
(0.79) 
3.27** 
(1.02) 
9 0.05 
5. Users would increase their estimates of 
risks involved in providing finance to 
lessees 
 83 3.51*** 
(0.76) 
3.01 
(0.93) 
11 0.01 
6. Lessee companies may need to 
renegotiate their borrowing covenants 
 82 3.43*** 
(0.77) 
3.96*** 
(0.81) 
3 0.01 
7. Financial statements would reflect the 
financial flexibility provided by different 
leasing arrangements 
 88 3.41** 
(0.98) 
2.77** 
(0.96) 
15 0.01 
8. Some lessees would experience a 
reduction in credit rating 
 81 3.40** 
(1.01) 
3.25*** 
(0.83) 
10 ns 
9. Lease terms would become shorter to 
minimise obligations 
 83 3.33** 
(0.79) 
3.41*** 
(0.95) 
6 ns 
10. Significant additional administrative 
burden 
 87 3.26 
(1.14) 
3.64*** 
(0.99) 
5 ns 
11. Significant additional compliance costs  88 3.21 
(1.08) 
3.70*** 
(0.95) 
4 0.05 
12. Lease finance would become less 
attractive 
 88 3.21 
(1.04) 
3.37*** 
(0.90) 
8 ns 
13. Users’ assessments of debt-paying ability 
of lessees would not be affected 
 84 3.10 
(0.97) 
3.01 
(0.84) 
12 ns 
14. New assets would be 
purchased/constructed rather than leased 
 83 2.91 
(0.98) 
2.81** 
(0.77) 
14 ns 
15. Shareholders would reduce their 
estimates of lessees’ ability to pay future 
dividends 
 81 2.80 
(0.76) 
2.62*** 
(0.75) 
16 ns 
16. Significant short-term reduction in UK 
investment and leasing volumes, to 
reduce perceived high gearing 
 82 2.63** 
(1.06) 
2.85 
(1.03) 
13 ns 
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 Panel B: Land and buildings 
 
  
 
 
n 
Mean2,3
(std. dev.) 
Preparer 
rank1b
 
 Question asked (abbreviated)1b Users Preparers Users Preparers  Diff.4
 To what extent do you agree that the 
following suggested consequences of the 
new approach apply to the leasing of 
land and buildings? 
      
1. Recording leased asset brings it within 
scope of impairment, with advantage of 
writing off any loss when it occurs not 
when decision taken to vacate property 
 78 3.50*** 
(0.71) 
3.22** 
(0.96) 
4 ns 
2. Advantage of showing increase in value 
arising from lessee sub-leasing at a higher 
rent 
 80 3.46*** 
(0.69) 
3.24*** 
(0.78) 
3 ns 
3. Companies would find it difficult and 
expensive to estimate the present value of 
future property rent increases 
 85 3.03 
(1.05) 
3.94*** 
(0.95) 
1 0.01 
4. Combined P&L expense (depreciation 
and interest) in the early years of a new 
property lease would substantially exceed 
market rent 
 77 3.00 
(0.86) 
3.55*** 
(0.88) 
2 0.01 
5. Property rental yields may rise to reflect 
higher risk arising from loss of security 
of long term tenants 
 76 2.84 
(0.99) 
3.07 
(0.97) 
6 ns 
6. Companies would be reluctant to enter 
long term property leases making it 
difficult to fund new property 
development 
 82 2.81 
(1.02) 
3.10 
(1.08) 
5 ns 
7. Companies would purchase property 
rather than lease 
 74 2.63*** 
(0.77) 
2.77** 
(0.85) 
7 ns 
 
 
Notes: See Table 1 
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Table 5: Lease accounting alternatives and implementation 
 
Panel A: Alternatives 
 
  
 
 
n 
Mean2,3
(std. dev.) 
Preparer 
rank1b
 
 Question asked (abbreviated)1b Users Preparers Users Preparers  Diff.4
 To what extent do you agree that the 
following statements regarding lease 
accounting alternatives? 
      
1. Note disclosure to be accompanied by 
analysis of lease commitments by asset 
type 
 89 3.76*** 
(0.85) 
3.75*** 
(0.93) 
1 ns 
2. Capitalised value of all leases recorded 
on balance sheet with other material 
aspects disclosed in a note 
 88 3.62*** 
(0.91) 
2.95 
(1.23) 
3 0.01 
3. Introduction of 75% threshold in finance 
lease classification 
 89 2.92 
(0.94) 
2.73** 
(0.97) 
4 ns 
4. Current distinction between finance and 
operating leases should be maintained 
 88 2.46*** 
(1.14) 
3.05 
(1.23) 
2 0.05 
5. Capitalised value of all leases recorded 
on balance sheet without note disclosure 
of other material aspects 
 88 2.46*** 
(0.82) 
2.27*** 
(0.95) 
5 ns 
 
Panel B: Implementation 
 
  
 
 
n 
Mean2,3
(std. dev.) 
Preparer 
rank1b
 
 Question asked (abbreviated)1b Users Preparers Users Preparers  Diff.4
 To what extent do you agree that the 
following statements regarding 
implementation of new proposals for 
lease accounting? 
      
1. Immediate implementation of proposals 
to new and existing leases 
 90 3.36** 
(1.01) 
2.61*** 
(1.25) 
1 0.01 
2. Transition period with operating lease 
capitalisation required for new leases and 
disclosure of capitalised value required 
for existing leases 
 90 2.85 
(0.99) 
2.52*** 
(1.14) 
4 ns 
3. Transition period with the capitalised 
value of (new and existing) leases 
disclosed and only incorporated in 
balance sheet at end of transition period 
 90 2.72 
(1.02) 
2.56*** 
(1.12) 
2 ns 
4. Transition period with operating lease 
capitalisation required for new leases 
only 
 90 2.54*** 
(0.97) 
2.55*** 
(1.19) 
3 ns 
 
Notes: See Table 1 
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